The conditions for protected handler execution.

Existing clients → HTTPS/TLS → FastAPI → Gateway → ODRE v3 → Core → Protected Handler. Clients keep their API contract; ODRE v3 runs between Gateway and Core, not between mobile devices and the server.

01

Security architecture

ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 are used in the server-side ODRE v3 boundary. Session, sequence, replay and authenticated request/response checks gate Protected Handler execution. Fail-Closed blocks the unverifiable request, not the whole server.

  • AdmissionValidates message shape, required fields, encoding, aggregate size, and supported response forms.
  • Handshake & sessionBinds protocol version, algorithm set, endpoint materials, transcript, route meaning, and session identifier.
  • Sequence & replayRequires exactly the next sequence value and rejects duplicates, rollback, gaps, and concurrent double execution.
  • Semantic bindingBinds method, normalized path and query, security-relevant headers, payload, session, sequence, protocol, and message type.
  • Response bindingProtects supported status, content type, selected headers, cookies, response body, and request relationship.
02

Cryptographic roles

ML-KEM-768

Encapsulates and recovers shared secret material for the protocol.

ML-DSA-65

Authenticates handshake material and transcript integrity.

Hybrid handshake

Binds the required cryptographic components to the same peer, session, and route meaning.

Successful primitive calls alone do not establish protection. Runtime identity, transcript binding, key confirmation, and session creation must also complete.
03

Fail closed without a silent classical-only downgrade.

If runtime identity, provider or dependency trust, PQC self-tests, handshake transcript, active session, strict sequence, semantic binding, worker ownership, or safe recovery cannot be established, a protected route does not enter its handler.

Public routes may remain available under application policy. This distinction lets operators preserve an explicitly public health surface without treating an unavailable protection runtime as permission to bypass protected controls.

04

Threat boundary and limitations

SurfaceRepresentative conditionControl location
AdmissionMalformed, oversized, or smuggling-shaped inputAdmission gate
SessionExpired or cross-session reuseSession engine
SequenceDuplicate, rollback, gap, or raceAtomic sequence gate
Native filesTOCTOU, symlink, junction, reparse, dependency injectionPlatform adapter and runtime trust
LifecycleStale lease, crash, early shutdownLifecycle controller
Client → server remains HTTPS/TLS; this is not mobile-to-server E2E PQC. ODRE PQC does not replace WAF, host security, business authorization or TLS, and does not guarantee protection after full root/OS compromise.
05

Release & verification

The security model above is tied to a specific verified release scope, not every environment.

Current artifact identity, supported platforms, SHA-256 values, validation results, advisories, and maintenance status are maintained in the Trust Center.

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